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III. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction of this appeal is conferred on this Court by an 
Order of the Utah Supreme Court dated May 3, 1994, transferring 
this case to the Utah Court of Appeals in accordance with Utah Code 
Ann. Section 78-2-2 (4) (1991) 
IV. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the trial court erred in failing to give an 
instruction pursuant to Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P. 2d 1224 
(Utah App. 1992) , stating that a property owner may be held 
negligent when the property owner's method of operation creates a 
situation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable 
acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition or defect. 
2. Whether the trial court erred in taxing witness fees 
against plaintiff in excess of the subpoena amount allowed by 
statute. 
V. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The decision to give an instruction is a legal conclusion. It 
is examined by the appellate court for correctness, giving no 
deference to the trial court. Larson v. Overland Thrift and Loan, 
818 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Utah App. 1991), cert, denied, 832 P.2d 476 
(Utah 1992). 
An award of costs is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. 
Morgan v. Morgan, 795 P.2d 684 (Ct. App. 1990). 
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VI. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, 
RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Utah Code Annotated Section 21-5-4. Fees and mileage. 
1. Every juror and witness legally required or in good faith 
requested to attend a trial court of record or not of record or a 
grand jury is entitled to: 
(a) $17 for each day in attendance; and 
U.C.A. Section 21-5-8: 
The fees and compensation of witnesses in all civil causes 
must be paid by the party who causes such witnesses to attend... 
The fees of witnesses paid in civil causes may be taxed as 
costs against the losing party. 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
1. Jensen brought this action to recover damages when he 
slipped and fell in a fuel loading dock at the Phillips Refinery on 
December 26, 1990, at approximately 8:30 a.m. 
2. Mr. Jensen's treating physician was deposed by Phillips 
and the deposition was used at trial. Phillips paid the doctor a 
$300.00 deposition fee. His fee was imposed as a taxable cost on 
Mr. Jensen after jury trial in an amended judgment. 
B. Nature of the Proceedings 
This case was tried to a jury on February 16, 1994. Jensen 
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requested the instruction contained in the appendix. After a 
defense jury verdict, a $300.00 deposition fee was taxed against 
plaintiff over his objection. 
C. Disposition of the Trial Court 
The trial court refused to give the Canfield instruction, 
stating that Canfield requires an "itinerant kind of act." 
Subsequent to the entry of judgment, Phillips asked that 
certain costs be taxed to plaintiff. The court allowed a $300.00 
deposition fee for the treating physician to be taxed despite the 
requirements of Utah Code Annotated Section 21-5-4, allowing only 
$17.00 for each day in attendance of a witness in a trial court of 
record. This cost was included in an amended judgment. 
D. Statement of Facts 
In the light most favorable to the jury verdict: 
1. On December 26, 1990, Mr. Jensen slipped on fluids in a 
fuel loading bay of the Phillips Refinery. (Transcript, herein 
after, "T", 34-35.) 
2. Mr. Jensen fell while loading fuel into his truck. 
During loading he braced his leg and forced the fuel loading arm 
onto his truck. (T. 34,46). 
3. Plaintiff was aware the area was slick when he got out of 
his truck. (T. 49) . 
4. Phillips was aware that fuel spills occurred at the fuel 
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bays. (T. 89). Phillips provided a water hose to wash down the 
fuel spills. (Id). Phillips also provided a squeegee to push the 
water down the drain. (T. 90) . However, this squeegee was kept in 
the office, not by the loading bay. (T. 98) . Further, salt and a 
shovel were provided near the loading bay. Id. 
5. At times, Phillips employees did observe ice on the 
ground at the loading bay. (T. 91). Phillips knew that this area 
of the refinery needed to be salted. (T. 94). Indeed, this dock 
where the accident occurred received first priority in snow removal 
and salting. Id. Phillips was aware that snow, ice, and petroleum 
products all cause slippery conditions. (T. 96). Phillips did not 
always wash the fuel down. (T. 97) . Further, the water used to 
wash the fuel down caused additional slipperiness. (T. 97, lines 
22 - 24) . Additionally, that water can freeze in front of the 
pumps. (T. 98). Further, having a truck through the loading bay 
spreading salt is insufficient. (T. 95). Additionally, the area 
must be re-salted on occasion because of slippery conditions. (T. 
95) . Phillips had no set time requiring the areas to be rechecked. 
(T. 95-96) . 
6. No warning signs existed concerning slippery conditions. 
(T. 98). Additionally, an imbedded metal grate was considered to 
help with slippery conditions, but was not present when this 
accident occurred. (T. 98-99). 
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FACTS REGARDING THE REQUESTED INSTRUCTION 
7. After submission of evidence, plaintiff requested the 
following Canfield instruction: 
Where the landowner's method of operation 
creates a situation where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third 
parties will create a dangerous condition or 
defect, the landowner may be found negligent. 
(R. 223-225, T. 110, instruction attached in Appendix A. 
8. The defendant also submitted a Canfield instruction which 
was declined by the court. (T. 110, R. 46, copy of instruction in 
Appendix B). The defense instruction proposed the following: 
In determining whether a business owner was 
negligent, the inquiry is whether the owner or 
its employees knew, or in the exercise of 
reasonable care should have known, that a 
dangerous condition existed, and whether 
sufficient time elapsed such that corrective 
action could have been taken to remedy the 
situation. Property owners are not insurers 
against all forms of actions that may happen 
to any who come. 
Whether the business owner chooses a method 
of operation where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third 
parties will create a dangerous condition, an 
injured party need not prove either actual or 
constructive knowledge of the specific 
condition. In such a case, the relevant 
question is whether the business owner took 
reasonable precautions to protect customers 
against the dangerous condition. 
9. In rejecting both Canfield instructions the court held: 
First of all, let me just say, I don't think 
that this is a case for the Canfield 
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instruction as proposed by Mr. Dalton. For 
one thing, that case presupposes that it's an 
itinerant kind of act that's there that the 
owner would have notice of. I don't think 
this fits within that category. I think in 
fact that this is one of those cases where the 
hazard essentially has been created by the 
owner, if in fact one has been created, and 
therefore he has notice of that and that's not 
required. 
Now, I don't think instruction 19 from MUJI 
essentially is different than that of Canfield 
as far as the plaintiffs are concerned. First 
of all, the instruction places the burden on 
the owner to use reasonable care, and I think 
that's what the standard is. It goes somewhat 
further in that it says if you actually have 
notice of the defect, then you have to post 
notice. So I don't think this is a statement 
of the present standard of the law in the 
State of Utah of reasonable care, and that's 
what this is, it required that the owner of 
the property keep the premises in a condition 
reasonably safe for business invitees, and 
that the personal property of the business 
invitee be brought to the premises in 
reasonable pursuit of purposes embraced within 
the invitation. (T. 110)-1 
10. Counsel for the plaintiff agreed to accept the defense 
Canfield instruction if his was declined. (T. 109). 
11. Instead, the court gave the following instruction: 
One who extends to a business invitee an 
invitation, express or implied, is obliged to 
refrain from acts of negligence and to 
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in 
a condition reasonably safe for the business 
invitee and the personal property of the 
1
. Jensen also objected to the "business invitee" language of 
the proposed instruction. That objection is not pursued on appeal. 
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business invitee brought to the premises in 
the reasonable pursuit of a purpose embraced 
within the invitation. 
The business invitee has a right to assume 
that the premises to which the business 
invitee was invited are reasonably safe for 
the purposes for which the invitation was 
extended, unless the business invitee 
observes, or a reasonably prudent person in 
like position would observe, conditions that 
caution otherwise. 
The responsibility of one having control of 
the premises is not absolute; it is not that 
of an insurer. If there is danger associated 
with the entry, or the work which the business 
invitee is to do on the premises, that arises 
from conditions not readily apparent to the 
senses, and if the owner has actual knowledge 
of such danger, or if such danger is 
discoverable by the owner in the exercise of 
reasonable care, it is the duty of the owner 
to giver reasonable warning of such danger to 
the business invitee. The owner is not bound 
to discover defects which reasonable 
inspection would not disclose. (Emphasis 
added). Appendix C. 
TAXING OF COSTS 
12. Subsequent to the jury verdict and judgment, defense 
sought to tax costs against plaintiff. 
13. The defense had taken the deposition of plaintiff's 
expert, Dr. Paulos. This deposition was read into the record at 
trial. (See T. 56). 
14. Defendant paid Dr. Paulos $300.00 for his deposition 
testimony. 
15. The court granted the $300.00 payment over the objection 
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of plaintiff in an amended judgment. (R. 241) (See Appendix C) . 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The court committed reversible error in issuing an 
instruction requiring plaintiff to show that the landowner knew, or 
in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the 
defect: 
2. Plaintiff is not required to pay the $300.00 witness fee 
for Dr. Paulos as it is in excess of the statutory amount. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
A. JENSEN DID NOT HAVE TO SHOW THAT PHILLIPS HAD ACTUAL 
NOTICE OF THE SPECIFIC DANGER ON THIS OCCASION. 
In general, there are two legal theories in which a landowner 
may be found negligent and held liable for an invitee's injuries in 
Utah. The first theory involves situations where there is a 
temporary or transient hazard on the property which was not created 
by the landowner, its agents, or employees. Under this theory, in 
order to find a landowner negligent, it must be shown that the 
landowner "knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care should have 
known, of any hazardous condition and had reasonable opportunity to 
remedy it." See, Canfield, supra, Koer v. Mayfair Markets, 431 
P.2d 566, 569 (1967); Accord, Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc. , 
538 P.2d 175, 176 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 
P.2d 360, 361 (Utah 1973); Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 
P.2d 623, 624 (UtahApp. 1991). 
10 
In this case, the trial court found that the conditions 
complained of by Jensen were not such "an itinerant kind of act 
that's there that the owner would have no notice of." (T.110) The 
court stated, "I think, in fact, this is one of those cases where 
the hazard essentially has been created by the owner, if in fact 
one has been created, and therefore he has notice of that ..." Id. 
Mr. Jensen agrees with this portion of the trial court's 
finding that the first theory of liability is not applicable. 
The second theory, which governs this case, involves 
situations where the landowner, its agents, or employees create or 
are responsible for the dangerous condition. Under this theory, a 
plaintiff does not need to establish notice since a landowner is 
deemed to have notice of the dangerous conditions it creates. See, 
Canfield, supra. 
This theory requires that the landowner, its agents, or 
employees actually create the dangerous condition or defect that 
results in an injury to a patron. However, there is no logical 
distinction between a situation in which the store owner directly 
creates the defect, and where the landowner's method of operation 
creates a situation where it is reasonably foreseeable that the 
expectable acts of third parties will create a dangerous condition 
or defect. Canfield. 
It is evident from the facts in this case that the method of 
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operation at Phillips created a situation where it was reasonably 
foreseeable that the expectable acts of third parties would create 
a condition or defect: 
(a) Phillips knew that the truckers spilled fuel. (T.89). 
(b) Phillips provided water to wash the fuel down, creating 
the slippery condition. (T.89). 
(c) The water would freeze, creating a slippery condition. 
(T.96) . 
The trial court found that "this is one of those cases where 
the hazard essentially has been created by the owner, if in fact 
one has been created . . . " (T. 110) 
For the court to then require in its instruction, over the 
proposed instructions of both counsel, that the plaintiff must show 
that Phillips knew or should have known of the danger on that 
particular day, flies in the face of Canfield. 
Indeed, defense counsel used this instruction to his advantage 
in arguing that the Phillips employee, Paul Hatch, had no notice of 
the problem. (T. 124, lines 6 - 12) 
There was nothing for Paul [Hatch] to do in 
this situation because he didn't know there 
was a problem. You see, even after Mr. Jensen 
injured himself, he didn't go to Paul. He 
didn't report the situation. He didn't come 
and tell us, 'Look, you have got a problem 
over there.' He loaded up, called the 
dispatcher to say he was done, went on his 
way. We didn't know. How can we correct 
something if we didn't know about it? It's 
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his responsibility to come tell us if there is 
a problem. Somebody else might encounter it. 
Defense counsel continued to argue this requirement that 
Phillips have notice, asserting contributory negligence on the part 
of plaintiff by stating plaintiff was required to, "Go tell 
somebody that there is a problem." (T. 126). 
The purpose of Canfield was to remove this requirement of 
knowledge argued by defense counsel; "to relieve the plaintiff of 
the requirement of proving actual or constructive notice in such 
instances is to affect a more equatable balance in regard to the 
burdens of proof." See, Canfield at 227 (Citations omitted). 
B. THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS IN EXCESS OF THOSE 
ALLOWED FOR BY STATUTE IS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION. 
The court awarded costs for Dr. Paulos' deposition in the 
amount of $300.00. The statutory witness fee is $17.00 plus 
mileage. (See, Utah Code Annotated, Sections 21-5-4, 21-5-8.) 
An award of costs in excess of those expressly allowed by 
statute for service of subpoena and witness fees is improper. 
Frampton v. Wilson, 605 P.2d 771 (Utah 1980) . Witness fees, travel 
expenses, and service of process expenses are chargeable only in 
accordance with the fee schedule set by statute. Morgan v. Morgan, 
795 P.2d 684 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Mr. Jensen does not contest whether the deposition was taken 
in good faith or essential for the development and presentation of 
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the case. He does not contest that the deposition was reasonable 
and necessary. He does contest the amount awarded for the 
deposition. 
As explained in Frampton, where expert witnesses were paid in 
excess of the subpoena rate. 
There is a distinction to be understood 
between the legitimate and taxable 'costs' and 
other 'expenses,' of litigation which may be 
ever so necessary but are not properly taxable 
as costs. Consistent with that distinction, 
the courts hold that expert witnesses cannot 
be awarded extra compensation unless the 
statute expressly provides. Frampton, at 774. 
The Supreme Court has expressly forbidden taxing expert fees 
in excess of that allowed by statute. 
This court followed Frampton in 1990, in holding that witness 
fees, travel expenses, and service of process expenses are 
chargeable only in accordance with the fee schedule set by statute. 
See, Morgan v. Morgan, supra. 
Further, it is not sufficient that the party be required to 
pay costs to present its case. The "Utah Supreme Court has defined 
costs to mean those fees which are required to be paid to the court 
and to witnesses, and for which the statutes authorize to be 
included in the judgment. Morgan , citing Frampton, at 774 
(emphasis added). 
Thus, it is a two part test requiring statutory authorization 
to be taxed as costs. Not only must the fees be required, the 
14 
statute must authorize them to be included in the judgment. The 
statute does not authorize Dr. Paulo's expert fee to be included in 
the judgment as held in Frampton. 
CONCLUSION 
It was foreseeable that the acts of third persons created a 
hazardous condition. The requirement that notice on the part of 
Phillips be shown by plaintiff, as stated in the court's 
instruction, is error. 
The court also erred when it allowed a witness fee in excess 
of that allowed by statute. 
For the foregoing reasons, plaintiff/appellant John Jensen 
respectfully requests that this court reverse the lower court's 
decision granting the cost of $300.00 and reverse the jury verdict 
due to the court's erroneous instruction. 
DATED this Jo day of June, 1994. 
Ah* 0 ft. 
GLEN A. COOK 
of and for 
COOK & LAWRENCE, L.L.C. 
Attorneys for Appellant 
I 
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four true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to 
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Donald Dalton 
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16 
XI. APPENDIX 
A. Plaintiff's Requested Instruction 
B. Defendant's Requested Instruction 
C. Court's Instruction 
D. Amended Judgment 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 
Where the landowner's method of operation creates a situation 
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of 
third parties will create a dangerous condition or defect, the land 
owner may be found negligent. 
Canfield v. Albertsons, 841 P.2d 1224 (Ct. App. 1992) 
Instruction No. 
In determining whether a business owner was negligent, 
the inquiry is whether the owner or its employees knew, or in the 
exercise of reasonable care should have known, that a dangerous 
condition existed, and whether sufficient time elapsed such that 
corrective action could have been taken to remedy the situation. 
Property owners are not insurers against all forms of accidents 
that may happen to any who come. 
Where the business owner chooses a method of operation 
where it is reasonably foreseeable that the expectable acts of 
third parties will create a dangerous condition, an injured party 
need not prove either actual or constructive knowledge of the 
specific condition. In such a case, the relevant question is 
whether the business owner took reasonable precautions to protect 
customers against the dangerous condition. 
INSTRUCTION NO. ,C* 
One who extends to a business invitee an invitation, express 
or implied, is obliged to refrain from acts of negligence and to 
exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a condition 
reasonably safe for the business invitee and the personal 
property of the business invitee brought to the premises in the 
reasonable pursuit of a purpose embraced within the invitation. 
The business invitee has a right to assume that the premises 
to which the business invitee was invited are reasonably safe for 
the purposes for which the invitation was extended, unless the 
business invitee observes, or a reasonably prudent person in like 
position would observe, conditions that caution otherwise. 
The responsibility of one having control of the premises is 
not absolute; it is not that of an insurer. If there is danger 
associated with the entry, or the work which the business invitee 
is to do on the premises, that arises from conditions not readily 
apparent to the senses, and if the owner has actual knowledge of 
such danger, or if such danger is discoverable by the owner in 
the exercise of reasonable care, it is the duty of the owner to 
give reasonable warning of such danger to the business invitee. 
The owner is not bound to discover defects which reasonable 
inspection would not disclose. 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN COREY JENSEN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT OF JURY (TAXING 
COSTS) 
Civil No. 920700394 
Honorable Rodney S. Page 
This action was tried before a jury in the above-
entitled Court, the Honorable Rodney S. Page presiding, on 
February 16, 1994. The jury entered its special verdict 
finding that plaintiff s negligence exceeded that of defendant 
and awarded him no damages. Based on the jury' s special 
verdict, the Court hereby orders that judgment be and is hereby 
entered in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. 
Within the time required by Rule 54(d)(2), U. R. C. P. , 
defendant filed its verified memorandum of costs to which 
plaintiff objected. For the reasons stated in a ruling on 
defendant' s motion to tax costs, the Court taxes costs against 
plaintiff in the amount of $704.00. 
.JUDGMENT ENTERED 00242530 
161X2511 
DATED this c45^ day of March, 1994. 
A£^ 
Judge Rodjiey S. Page 
Second Judicial District Court 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct 
copy of the within and foregoing AMENDED JUDGMENT ON SPECIAL 
VERDICT OF JURY (TAXING COSTS) to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
this 22nd day of March, 1994, to the following: 
Glen A. Cook 
Morris & Morris 
4001 South 700 East #240 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 ( IA^L-UI^. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
JOHN COREY JENSEN, 
plaintiff, 
vs. 
PHILLIPS PETROLEUM COMPANY, 
defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
TO TAX COSTS 
Case No. 9207 00394 
Comes now the Court and having reviewed defendant's motion to tax costs, the 
memorandum in support thereof, plaintiffs memorandum submitted in opposition thereto and 
being fully advised in the premises, the Court hereby rules as follows: 
The plaintiff does not object to the costs of plaintiffs deposition as being a reasonably 
necessary expense in defense of the case in question. The Court finds that it is was 
reasonable and necessary and therefore grants the same. As to the costs of the deposition of 
Dr. Lonnie Paulos, the Court finds that Dr. Paulos was plaintiffs expert and that his 
deposition was reasonably necessary for the development of defendant's case. The Court 
further finds that each of the parties relied upon the deposition of Dr. Paulos and allowed it 
to be used in place of the personal appearance of Dr. Paulos. The Court therefore concludes 
that the cost of his deposition together with the fee paid him to testify are both reasonable 
and therefore allows the same. The Court denies the $100.00 appearance fee as there 
appears no adequate explanation for the same and it appears unreasonable. 
Defendant's counsel is to prepare an amended judgment which includes these costs 
and submit the same to plaintiffs counsel at least five days prior to the time it is submitted 
to the Court for signature. 
Dated this Zt^r day of March, 1994. 
)r*Qu ^ LL J.£. 
District Coyrt Judge ^ 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing ruling, on the 
JLmm. 
J}\ -~day of March, 1994, postage prepaid to the following: 
Glen A. Cook 
4001 South 700 East, #240 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
Donald L. Dalton 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P.O. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145 
Deputy Clerk 
